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This paper studies the economic impact of the current global economic downturn 
on the household sector. Household budgets can be negatively affected by declines 
in nominal wages and increases in unemployment. We empirically test this effect 
for the small open emerging economy. As a result of a lack of individual data on 
household finances, micro data are simulated. Our analysis clearly shows that there 
is a significant additional decline in consumption related to an increase in 
household default rates and unemployment. We find that potential household 
insolvencies have important implications for the financial system as well as for the 
macroeconomy. 
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1. Introduction 
There are numerous studies that address household financial distress. Some investigate the 
main drivers of the insolvency risk and try to link them to the macroeconomic environment 
while others focus on the effects of adverse macroeconomic scenarios on household 
consumption. Of note is that only a few studies discuss the household credit cycle as a whole. 
The lack of research on this issue is largely related to insufficient household statistics on 
structured balance sheets and consumption. 
The ongoing economic crisis has a negative effect on household balance sheets and can cause 
financial distress. This paper aims to assess the impact of the economic recession on a 
household’s finances by taking their debt burden into account and evaluating the negative 
feedback on the aggregate economy via reduced consumption. This is of particular importance 
from the government’s perspective, as household insolvencies can significantly reduce 
government revenue and increase the need for social spending. 
The next section contains a literature review on household distress, insolvency triggers and 
the impact of adverse macroeconomic scenarios on a household’s balance sheet. Section 3 
discusses the modelling framework and presents a model for a single household mortgage 
default. It also looks at the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on aggregate 
consumption. Section 4 contains a description of the available data for the Czech economy. 
The empirical results are presented in section 5, and the final section summarises and 
concludes. 
 
    
2. Related Literature 
A number of studies address the issue of household insolvency and focus specifically on the 
main drivers. The recent financial turmoil and subsequent economic recession provide 
additional incentive for creditors as well as regulators to deal with the issue. Four main 
streams of research can be identified. The first looks at household default prediction, using a 
traditional insolvency framework. The second focuses on the impact of household defaults on 
the financial sector within a stress test framework for evaluating the potential negative effects 
of adverse macroeconomic scenarios. The third focuses on the optimal legal framework to 
deal with individual insolvencies. The fourth addresses the credit cycle and consumption.  
The first group of studies focus on household default prediction. Peter and Peter (2006) 
investigate the main drivers of household default. To this end they developed a risk 
management model for the Australian economy, using micro data from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics. DeVaney and Lytton (1995) chose to focus on household insolvency by applying 
a predictive model and using financial ratios to identify insolvent households. They discuss 
the implications for monitoring household solvencies and present a response to insolvencies. 
Herrala and Kauko (2007) present a micro simulation model of household distress. They use a 
logit analysis to estimate the extent to which a household’s risk of being financially distressed 
depends on net income after tax and loan servicing costs. The impact of the assumed 
macroeconomic shocks on the net income is calculated at the household level. Their micro 
simulation model is used to simulate both the number of distressed households and their 
aggregate debt in various macroeconomic scenarios. Del-Rio and Young (2005) examine how 
attitudes towards unsecured debt are related to household finances and other characteristics, 
using a British Household Panel Survey. This analysis suggests that the main causal factors 
for problems relating to debt are the unsecured debt-income ratio, the level of mortgage 
income gearing, the level of households’ financial wealth, and their health, ethnicity and   2
marital status. They also concluded that the increase in levels of indebtedness of young people 
was the main factor driving the greater tendency to report debt related problems. 
The second research stream tries to evaluate the impact of household defaults on the financial 
sector under adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Kadeřábek, Slabý and Vodička (2008) 
modelled household default probability as a function of macroeconomic variables, such as 
wages, unemployment and interest rates. They further employed an estimated model within 
the stress test framework by applying exogenous stress scenarios for the development of these 
indicators. The authors pointed out that stress-sensitivity of default probability is mainly 
driven by the instalment-to-income ratio and loan maturity. Jakubík, Schmieder (2008) 
estimated macroeconomic models for forecasting household default for the Czech and 
German economies. They employed these models to stress test banking portfolios and pointed 
out that macroeconomic indicators alone have limited use in explaining household defaults. 
Moreover Jiménez, Saurina (2006) found strong empirical support for a positive lagged 
relationship between rapid credit growth and loan losses. Their study contains empirical 
evidence of lax credit standards during boom periods, in terms of screening of borrowers as 
well as collateral requirements and loan losses. They advocate a regulatory prudential tool 
based on a countercyclical, or forward-looking, loan loss provision that takes into account the 
credit risk profile of a bank’s loan portfolios across the business cycle. 
The third group of studies focuses on the optimal legal framework. Li and Sarte (2006) study 
the implications of US personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare. They 
found that the complete elimination of bankruptcy provisions can cause a significant decline 
in output and welfare as it reduces capital formation and labour input. Feibelman (2009) 
pointed out that the deepening of consumer finances promotes growth and development in 
emerging markets. His research stressed the importance of consumer bankruptcy law as an 
effective form of regulation to address the problem of over-indebtedness. He calls for 
emerging economies to consider adopting a consumer bankruptcy system or modernizing their 
existing regimes.  
The fourth research group focuses on consumption and economic growth, employing credit 
cycle models. Chang, Hanna, Fan (1997) presented and empirically tested a three-period 
model for optimal consumption. The latter suggests that many US consumers without 
sufficient levels of liquid assets may be acting rationally. Elmer and Seeling (1998) combine 
the issue of consumption and solvency. They proposed a theoretical model for a single family 
mortgage default and investigated events that could trigger defaults within this framework. 
McCallum (1988) applies an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of the real business cycle 
approach to the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations. Tudela, Young (2005) using an 
overlapping generation model to explain rising household indebtedness. They also investigate 
the impacts of various events, such as a fall in house prices, a fall in pension income, and an 
increase in interest rates, on household wealth, indebtedness and consumption. Evidence of a 
positive effect of wealth on Italian households’ consumption was found by Bassanetti, Zollino 
(2008), and the influence of income distribution in modelling aggregate consumption 
expenditure was analysed by Chakrabarty, Schmalenbach and Jeffrey (2006). For the 
Netherlands, the impact of financial capital losses relative to gains on household savings and 
consumption is investigated by Berben, Bernoth and Mastrogiacimo (2006). Their results 
suggest that households react more strongly to capital losses than to capital gains. Thus, the 
failure to take this asymmetry into account could seriously influence estimates of marginal 
propensity to consume from wealth. Effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 
19 OECD countries are estimated by Barrel, Davis and Pomerantz (2006). Their results show 
that consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis and that the 
effects are not fully captured by the impact of crises on the standard consumption   3
determinants, i.e. income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-
varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising 
leverage, despite financial liberalisation and easing of liquidity constraints. High leverage in 
some countries implies that banking crises could have a greater incidence than in the past.  
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Households are usually affected by an adverse negative economic scenario with some time 
lag, but the impact is more persistent than in the corporate sector. As a consequence of an 
economic crisis, firms reduce production to cope with declining aggregate demand. To do so, 
they need to reduce the labour force or decrease wages. However, the wages are usually 
“downward sticky”; so that firms need to make employees redundant. Alternatively, they 
could reduce the variable part of salaries such as bonuses or other benefits. As employees 
become unemployed they also become dependent on social benefits. Moreover, if they are 
indebted they are not able to cover their current payments with their current income. Thus, if 
they are not able to find employment, the only solution is to use their savings. In the end this 
provides a temporary solution that postpones their insolvency.  
 
Single-household Mortgage Default 
To investigate household insolvency, we consider a three period pure exchange model with no 
taxes, as e.g. in Elmer and Seelig (1998). Individuals are endowed with initial income (y0) and 
invest in real estate equity (p0), financed by a fixed-rate mortgage (m0) at time 0. It could 
further be assumed that rents earned from real estate equity are fully consumed in the period 
received and that periodic consumption (ct) is the recorded net of these earnings. Unsecured 
borrowing (bt) is a residual that smoothes out intertemporal consumption. However it can also 
be positive, and in such case it is interpreted as savings in the form of a deposit. Initial 
income, the value of investment in real estate equity and the interest rate (yt, pt, it) are known, 
but may differ from their future realised values. An individual chooses his optimal life cycle 
consumption pattern as follows: 
) , , ( max 2 1 0 c c c U           ( 1 )  
S.T. 
0 0 0 0 0 ) ( b m p y c      
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) 1 )( ( )) 1 ( ( 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 i b b i m p y c         
, 0 , , 2 1 0  c c c  
This model can easily be extended to include any arbitrary number of periods (see Fama and 
Miller (1972) or Hirschleifer (1970) for further details). Within this framework, a key role is 
played by uncertainty about future income, interest rates and house prices. An adverse change 
in these variables increases the possibility of exercising the option to refinance a mortgage (R) 
or default (D). The strategic option to default is chosen if the default transaction costs exceed 
a present value of interest savings in case of mortgage refinancing. If the refinance and 
strategic default options fall out of the money, then the period 0 debt remains and the revised 
choice (1) can be reformulated to a two-period optimization problem with debt constraints 
from prior commitments: 
   4
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We further focus on the situation of an adverse macroeconomic shock and its impact on 
household income. In our model framework, the consumer must at least cover the debt 
obligations in both periods. We further assume a shock to income   0
'
1 y  holding interest 
rate and house prices constant. Solvency in period 1 requires borrowing against period 2 
wealth at least in the amount of   0 0 0 0 i b i m  , and thus a  household defaults if 
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that is, borrowing from previous periods exceeds homeowner equity. It is quite an expected 
result. If an individual cannot meet his obligation, he can still sell owned real estate in order to 
avoid default. However, he will default if the value of his equity does not cover his debt 
obligation. 
This simple framework can help us to understand the basic default trigger based on the shock 
to income. But in practice things are more complicated, as mortgages can have different 
maturities, which implies different annuities, and a mortgage is usually paid back in fixed 
monthly instalments. We also need to calculate disposable income as income purged of living 
costs. Moreover, Herrala, Kauko (2007) define household distress as a situation where the 
increment in household surplus (income diluted by debt service payment), via the incurrence 
of new debt, is smaller than the minimum level of consumption. They assume that households 
can temporarily sustain consumption by taking more debt or running down their stocks of 
liquid assets.  
 
 
Impact of Adverse Scenario on Aggregate Consumption  
From the creditor’s point of view, a precise estimation of future household default is one of 
the most challenging issues. On the other hand, the objective of financial regulators is to 
assess the future course of the economy and the potential threat to financial stability. 
Households’ inability to meet their financial obligations results not only in higher default rates 
and losses for the financial sector but also as in a significant decline in household 
consumption, which has a negative effect on the aggregate economy. To estimate this impact 
we can use a simple Keynesian framework (see e.g. Romer (1996)) 
cY C C   0 ,            ( 4 )  
where C denotes aggregate consumption, C0 autonomous consumption, c marginal propensity 
to consume and Y disposable income. We further assume an adverse macroeconomic scenario 
corresponding to declines in gross domestic product and disposable income. Then a decline in 
consumption can be expressed as 
Y c C    ,            ( 5 )  
whereis the operator for change in level. However, in the case of a significant increase in 
household default rates, there is an additional feedback effect of household insolvency on 
aggregate consumption. Hence, the decline in consumption calculated via formula (5) can be   5
considerably underestimated due to the underestimation of the marginal propensity to 
consume.  
To better estimate the impact of a decline in disposable income on consumption, we can 
simply divide consumers into two groups – defaulted [proportion d] and non-defaulted [(1-d)].  
Then, aggregate consumption can be expressed as 
n d C d dC C ) 1 (              ( 6 )  
where  d C  denotes consumption of the defaulted and  n C non-defaulted households. Using this 
formula, the decline in consumption in response to the decline in disposable income or GDP 
can be derived. Using the Keynesian formula, we assume that consumers reduce their 
consumption proportionally to the decline in disposable income, which corresponds to the 
decline in GDP. If we further assume that disposable income of the defaulted household group 
is equal to zero in the limit, then their consumption is equal to the autonomous consumption 
related to the necessary living expense: 
cY d C cY C d C d C d dC C n d ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( * ) 1 ( 0 0 0               ( 7 )  
In the case of an adverse macroeconomic scenario, GDP or disposable income declines and 
the household insolvency rate increases. Aggregate consumption is influenced by both these 
effects and can be easily derived from formula (7).  
)] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( Y d Y d c C                 ( 8 )  
We see from equation (8) that for small changes in household insolvency, we can omit the 
second term in formula (8), but for significant changes, it can play an important role and the 
omission of the second term can cause a significant underestimation of the decrease in 
consumption.  
 
If we further take into account that the marginal propensity to consume could significantly 
differ for the unemployed and employed consumers, we can reformulate equation (7) for the 
aggregate consumption as 
 
) ) 1 ( )( 1 ( 0 Y c u Y uc d C C E U              ( 9 )  
 
where  U c  and  E c  are the marginal propensity to consume for the unemployed and employed 
consumers and u is the unemployment rate. In the case of an adverse macroeconomic 
scenario, we need to also take into account, together with the change in GDP and the change 
in household default rate, the change in the unemployment rate, to calculate the effect on 
aggregate consumption. Formally, after some derivation we obtain the formula (10). 
 
 
Y dc u d du u d u c c Y c c c u d C E E U E E U ) 1 ]( ) )( [( ] ) ( )[ 1 (                      
(10) 
 
We see from equation (10) that - in the absence of a significant difference between marginal 
propensities to consume for unemployed and employed consumers - formula (10) resembles 
formula (8). Formula (10) reveals that, with a significant difference between marginal 
propensities to consume for unemployed and employed consumers, a change in the 
unemployment and default rates can have a marked impact on the change in aggregate 
consumption.   6
 
 
4. Available Data 
The limiting factor in modelling household insolvencies is usually the availability of the 
appropriate data. To estimate the household default rate we would need to know more about 
the distribution of income and the debt burden across the population. Furthermore, we would 
need an estimate of the necessary living expenses as well as information on interest rates on 
loans to households. We empirically tested the transmission channels for the Czech Republic 
as a small open and emerging economy. Unfortunately, the relevant data are not available in 
this case.
1 We have neither micro data nor sufficient information on the income distribution. 
Thus we make a simplifying assumption to deal with this problem. 
The Czech Statistical Office is the main data source for Czech household statistics. Apart 
from that, the Czech National Bank provides some additional statistics on the aggregate bases 
such as household financial assets, banking and non-banking loans to households. Moreover, 
the average bank interest rates on consumption and housing loans to household are published 
by the Czech National Bank. Some additional characteristics of the mortgage markets can be 
obtained from Fincentrum Hypoindex. However, micro data are available only from the 
Czech Statistical Office. These statistics are based on household surveys and include some 
characteristics of households. In connection with household insolvency, they provide 
information on household net income but not on characteristics of the debt burden except for 
binary (yes/no) information such as whether the given households have mortgages. Moreover, 
the debt burden related to consumer loans is not covered by these statistics. Another serious 
disadvantage is the relatively long lag; for example, the latest statistics are based on 
information collected in the year before the last complete year. This lack of appropriate 
statistics causes difficulties in making estimations.  
The income distribution of households with and without mortgages reveals that the 
indebtedness of low income Czech households is relatively limited. The income distribution 
of households with a mortgage is positively skewed compared to that of households without a 
mortgage.  
 
Chart 1: Household income distribution (Statistics of Family Accounts 2007)  
(x axis: monthly household net income, CZK 1000; y axis: %) 
 
                                                 
1 The appropriate data can be obtained from credit registers or household surveys for some countries.   7
Based on statistics from Fincentrum Hypoindex, we see that since 2006 the average value of 
mortgage loans has been rising over time, but the rise is less than that in residential property 
prices (see Table 1). We also find slower growth in nominal wages compared to changes in 
residential property prices in the same period. This reflects the fact that owner-occupation is 
becoming less accessible to Czech households over time. Although the income situation had 
been improving until 2008, it still did not compensate for the increase in residential property 
prices.
2  
Table 1: Average mortgage loan 
2005 2006 2007 2008 03/2009
Average mortgage loan (end of period, in ths.CZK) 1412 1450 1707 1766 1802
Growth of average mortgage loan (in %) 11.4 2.7 17.7 3.5 2.0
Change in residential property prices (y-o-y, in %) 6.0 10.4 18.9 12.5
Growth of average gross monthly nominal wage (y-o-y, in %) 5.3 6.5 7.3 8.5 -2.6
Consumer price Inflation (end of period, in %) 2.2 1.7 5.4 3.6 2.3
Source: Fincentrum Hypoindex 
Note: 03/2009 correspond to quarterly change  
 
5. Empirical Results 
To evaluate the impact of the economic crisis on the household sector, we focus mainly on the 
income transmission channel that was most important for the Czech economy in the post-
crisis period.  
Due to the lack of micro data on household balance sheets
3, we employ aggregate data from a 
bank credit registry and a one factor model to link the household insolvency to key 
macroeconomic variables (see model specification e.g. in Jakubik (2007), Hamerle, Liebig, 
Scheule (2004) and Appendix).
4 These data include total recent past-due loans, which was 
used to proxy the credit default rate. The indicator for household credit risk was calculated 
based on new 3-month past-due loans. However, the only short time series for the household 
sector covered the period 3Q/2007-3Q/2009. Although these data were available at monthly 
frequency, for some macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth, only quarterly data were 
available. In order to estimate the model on the basis of such a short time series, we used 
monthly data and linear interpolation for GDP growth and its components such as 
consumption. The model was calibrated by maximising a likelihood function (see Appendix). 
In line with economic theory, we considered macroeconomic variables which can drive 
household insolvency and whose forecasts are published by the Czech National Bank. 
Automatic selection based on stepwise regression minimising residual sum of squares was 
used to find the combination of variables with the greatest prediction power and optimal time 
lag. Moreover, we ensure that coefficients have signs in line with economic theory. Our final 
non-linear model is able to explain relatively well the historic household default rate pattern. 
According to our results, Czech household default rates can be explained by lagged real GDP 
                                                 
2 At the end of 2008, banks started to tighten credit standards due to the ongoing economic recession. The 
increasing uncertainty about future income together with the resultant negative expectations of households 
caused a rapid slowdown in credit growth. Moreover, the economic decline which started in 2008 is reflected in 
an increase in household sector credit risk. 
3 Although we have information on the historical distribution of household net income, the rest of the statistics 
are available on the aggregate level only. 
4 Econometric models which employ macroeconomic indicators to explain household insolvency or default rate 
include e.g. Rösch, Scheule (2007), Kadeřábek, Slabý, Vodička (2007), Jakubík, Schmieder (2008) or Danmarks 
Nationalbank (2007). They employ as dependent variables indicators e.g. GDP, unemployment, wage growth, 
household income, interest rates, or indebtedness of the household sector. Some other studies directly link banks’ 
provisions, which should ideally capture expected losses with an macroeconomic indicator (see e.g. Pain 2003). 
Moreover Trück, Rachev (2005) investigated the effects of changes in migration matrices on credit portfolio risk 
in terms of expected losses and value-at-risk.    8
growth, changes in the unemployment rate, lagged nominal wage growth and changes in 
interest rates (see equation (11) and Table 2, where the lags are in quarters and denotes the 
cumulative normal distribution function, and, for model performance, Chart 2 of the 
Appendix, One-factor Model with Default Barrier Depending on Macroeconomic 
Environment). 
)) ( ) ( ( 4 3 4 1 3 1 2 4 !             t t t t t t r r w u u gdp c df            ( 1 1 )  
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic model for Czech household sector 
Description of variable corresponding 
to estimated coefficient
Notation Estimate Standard error Pr>|t|
Constant c -2.127 0.015  <.0001
Real GDP growth (1) gdp t-4 -0.028 0.003 <.0001
Change in unemployment () u - u t-1 0.012 0.004 0.009
Nominal wage growth (3) w t-1 -0.012 0.001 <.0001
Change in interest rate (4) r t-3 - r t-4 0.034 0.007 0.0001
Note: The lag length is in quarters.  
Our results showed that lagged real gross domestic product growth negatively affects default 
rates. Moreover, a decrease in lagged nominal wage growth, an increase in the unemployment 
rate and an increase in lagged interest rates each have positive effects on household 
insolvencies. Our model captures both the asset and liabilities side of households’ balance 
sheet. While unemployment and nominal wages impact household income, interest rates 
influence household financial costs. Real GDP is used as a proxy for factors affecting 
disposable income not covered by the previously mentioned indicators. Household financial 
distress or default can be defined as a situation where a debtor is not able to service its 
outstanding debt. In such case, the household’s disposable income is negative. 
Nevertheless, the model based on individual data is usually able to better explain household 
defaults. Peter and Peter (2006) identify five groups of mortgage default determinants that 
relate to the following: income, credit history, macroeconomics, borrower location, and 
demographics. They pointed out that although the most important cause of mortgage default is 
a fall in household income, the other factors may also be important for future default 
estimation.  
 
Decrease in Nominal Wages 
Given the sharp fall in economic activity related to the economic crisis, the potential decrease 
in nominal wages (see Table 1) can be regarded as a relatively plausible scenario for the 
Czech economy. For this reason we try to identify a decrease in household nominal income 
that would cause a massive increase in loan defaults by households at the aggregate level and 
prompt a collapse of the mortgage market. Although individual data on household 
indebtedness are not available, the recently published survey of the Czech Statistical office 
revealed that about 10% of Czech households are repaying mortgage loans and roughly 20 % 
are repaying consumer credit. This means that a significant part of the population is involved 
and renders the issue an important one for analysis.  
To quantify the effects of wage shocks, we consider two variants of a typical indebted 
household. In the first case, the household is only repaying a mortgage loan and in the second 
case it is repaying both a mortgage loan and a consumer loan. These are being repaid in   9
regular monthly instalments. In both cases we assume a three-member family with one child 
and monthly living costs of CZK 15,000.
5 As micro data reflecting the current situation are 
not available, we use micro data simulation to model household income, assuming a normal 
distribution with mean and standard deviations based on the available aggregate statistics.
6 
Furthermore, we assume that each household is repaying a mortgage loan corresponding to 5 
years of income with a maturity of 20 years, where household income is sufficient to cover 
monthly instalments and minimum living costs.
7 If household income is not adequate, the 
maturity is prolonged to a maximum of 30 years. If that is still not enough, the household is 
not granted a mortgage loan. The interest rate is assumed to correspond to the average rate on 
mortgages at the end of 2009.  
In the second variant, we additionally consider the repayment of a consumer loan of up to 
CZK 100,000 with 5-year maturity and an interest rate corresponding to the average rate on 
such credit at the end of 2009. The amount of the consumer loan is set so that the household is 
able to cover the monthly payment. If household income is not sufficient to cover the monthly 
mortgage payment and essential living costs, a consumer loan is assumed not to be granted. 
 For both variants we test the impacts of a wage shock on hypothetical family budgets in 
relation to initial nominal incomes. We can formulate a household surplus, which is available 
for consumption, in line with model (1).  
MC I Y S    ,          ( 1 2 )  
where S  denotes the household surplus, Y  household net income, I  the loan instalment that 
household is committed to and MC household’s essential living costs. We define household 
distress as a situation where the household surplus is close to zero and the household is only 
able to cover the essential living costs. In contrast to Herrala and Kauko (2007) we do not 
take into account a pledgeable amount of wealth, as its distribution among households with a 
mortgage is not available. And, contrary to Elmer and Seelig (1998), we simplify the analysis 
by ignoring homeowner equity. In calculating household net income, we take account of the 
Czech tax code. 
The results show that if households with a mortgage had no other loan, the budgets of about 
30% of them would go into deficit if nominal wages declined by more than 10%. If this group 
of households also had a consumer loan of CZK 100,000, around 50% of them would be hit. 
However, the estimates of the proportion of households with difficulty in making loan 
repayments are extreme. For example, the assumption of constant living costs is very 
conservative, since households can in reality cut their living costs to some extent if needed. 
Moreover, a large proportion of households can cope with a potentially bad situation by 
selling their assets (bank deposits, life insurance, private pension schemes, building saving 
schemes) or are insured against the inability to repay debts.  
                                                 
5 For both variants we assume a family corresponding to the typical mortgage recipient in the Czech Republic. 
According to CZSO data, this is most often a household with two economically active members and one child. 
The main breadwinner is a 39-year-old man with a secondary education. His partner is a 33-year-old employee 
or housewife with a secondary or basic education. Essential living costs can be estimated on the basis of the 
household budget statistics on expenditures on food, clothing, housing, health, transport and restaurants. These 
expenditures can alternatively be estimated as the sum of the minimum subsistence amount and normal housing 
expenses, as stipulated in a government order of 16 December 2008. In both cases, the estimated amount is about 
CZK 15,000. 
6 We are aware of the non-normality of household income (see Chart 1). However, with a host of other 
simplifications and assuming only households with mortgages, this should not significantly bias our results.   
7This reflects common banking practice for the mortgage granting process in the Czech Republic.    10
Alternatively, the macroeconomic forecast model (9) can be employed. It suggests a much 
more modest impact of the shock. However, the macro model usually cannot deal well with 
the extreme scenario, so we could assume that the results obtained by micro-simulation would 
be much closer to reality. Despite a lot of simplifications and limitations, our exercise points 
out that a potential decrease in nominal incomes can cause serious difficulties and cause 
distress to a significant number of households with debt burdens. This could happen as a 
result of a shorter working week or cutbacks in variable wage components. In such a situation, 
the number of insolvencies would rise sharply and the quality of bank loan portfolios would 
fall. This would lead to a decline in residential property prices due to the sale of collateral. A 
decrease in the value of collateral (or a fall in the LTV ratio) would increase the risk to which 
banks are exposed. Moreover, a significant increase in household insolvencies would also 
have a negative social impact. 
 
 
Impact on Aggregate Consumption 
The current economic crisis is manifested in increasing unemployment. According to the 
CNB  (2010) baseline scenario, the default rate on banking loans to households should 
increase by roughly 2 percentage.points during 2010 due to a deteriorating labour market 
situation and a decline in household disposable income. In a highly unfavourable scenario this 
indicator could rise by as much as 5 percentage points. Using formula (10), we can estimate 
the impact on aggregate consumption for different negative changes in economic growth 
measured by GDP. The proportion of defaulted households can be obtained as the product of 
default rate and share of household with debt burden. According to a survey by the Czech 
Statistical Office, 20% of households are repaying mortgage loans and 10% consumer loans. 
We do not know how many households with mortgage loans are also repaying consumer 
credit at the same time. We assume that 25% of Czech households have some debt burden. 
According to some studies, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) can differ for 
unemployed and employed consumers. Thomson, Chung and McKibbin (2009) empirically 
tested MPC for households worried and not worried about their future job and pointed out that 
MPC significantly differs for these two groups. If we further express change in consumption 
as a ratio to GDP, we can reformulate equation (10) in formula (13).  
 
) 1 ]( ) )( [( ] ) ( )[ 1 (
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Y
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
            

   

           ( 1 3 )  
 
where parameter k corresponds to the share of consumers with some debt burden (k = 0.25) 
and d corresponds to household default rate (we assume d = 0.5, which corresponds to default 
on banking loan portfolio to households at the end of 2009). We employ the value 0.9 for the 
parameter  cE - marginal propensity to consume for employed consumers and 0.5 for the 
parameter cU - marginal propensity to consume for unemployed consumers.
8 The following 
                                                 
8 The marginal propensity to consume can be estimated using aggregate data. Barry, Bradley, Kejak and Vavra 
(2000) employed the value of 0.8 for the Czech economy. Thomson, Chung and McKibbin (2009) estimated 
MPC for households worried about their future job at close to 0.9 and for households not worried about their 
future job at close to 0.5. The Czech aggregated data suggest an MPC of close to 0.9. Hence we used this value 
for employed consumers.  For unemployed consumers, we set this parameter at 0.5, in line with the study of 
Thomson, Chung and McKibbin (2009), as MPC for households worried about their future job should be the 
upper estimate for unemployed consumers.   11
tables illustrate the change in aggregate consumption as a result of change in the GDP growth 
rate, default rate and unemployment rate 
 
Table 3: Change in consumption as a result of a change in GDP growth rate, default rate and 
unemployment rate (% of GDP) 
u = 1%
-4.8658 12345
-1 -1.47 -1.69 -1.91 -2.13 -2.36
-2 -2.32 -2.54 -2.76 -2.98 -3.20
-3 -3.17 -3.38 -3.60 -3.82 -4.04
-4 -4.02 -4.23 -4.45 -4.66 -4.88
-5 -4.87 -5.08 -5.29 -5.50 -5.72
-6 -5.71 -5.93 -6.14 -6.35 -6.56
-7 -6.56 -6.77 -6.98 -7.19 -7.40























-1 -1.86 -2.08 -2.30 -2.52 -2.74
-2 -2.71 -2.92 -3.14 -3.36 -3.58
-3 -3.55 -3.77 -3.98 -4.20 -4.42
-4 -4.40 -4.61 -4.82 -5.04 -5.25
-5 -5.24 -5.45 -5.66 -5.88 -6.09
-6 -6.09 -6.30 -6.51 -6.72 -6.92





















Change in household default rate (in percentage points)
u = 3%
-5.6163 12345
-1 -2.25 -2.47 -2.69 -2.91 -3.13
-2 -3.09 -3.31 -3.53 -3.75 -3.96
-3 -3.93 -4.15 -4.36 -4.58 -4.80
-4 -4.78 -4.99 -5.20 -5.41 -5.63
-5 -5.62 -5.83 -6.04 -6.25 -6.46
-6 -6.46 -6.67 -6.87 -7.08 -7.29





















Change in household default rate (in percentage points)
u = 4%
-5.9916 12345
-1 -2.64 -2.86 -3.08 -3.30 -3.52
-2 -3.48 -3.70 -3.91 -4.13 -4.35
-3 -4.32 -4.53 -4.75 -4.96 -5.17
-4 -5.15 -5.37 -5.58 -5.79 -6.00
-5 -5.99 -6.20 -6.41 -6.62 -6.83
-6 -6.83 -7.04 -7.24 -7.45 -7.66





















Change in household default rate (in percentage points)
 
Furthermore, the negative feedback effect on the aggregate consumption stemming from the 
adverse macroeconomic scenario can be calculated using the second term in the formula (13).   12
The following tables illustrate the size of this effect for different rates of GDP growth, default 
rate and unemployment rate. 
 
Table 4: Additional feedback effect on aggregate consumption (% of GDP) 
u = 1%
-0.589 12345
-1 -0.61 -0.84 -1.06 -1.28 -1.50
-2 -0.61 -0.83 -1.05 -1.27 -1.49
-3 -0.60 -0.82 -1.04 -1.25 -1.47
-4 -0.60 -0.81 -1.03 -1.24 -1.46
-5 -0.59 -0.80 -1.01 -1.23 -1.44
-6 -0.58 -0.79 -1.00 -1.21 -1.43
-7 -0.58 -0.78 -0.99 -1.20 -1.41























-1 -1.00 -1.23 -1.45 -1.67 -1.89
-2 -0.99 -1.21 -1.43 -1.65 -1.87
-3 -0.98 -1.20 -1.42 -1.63 -1.85
-4 -0.97 -1.19 -1.40 -1.62 -1.83
-5 -0.96 -1.18 -1.39 -1.60 -1.81
-6 -0.95 -1.16 -1.37 -1.58 -1.79
-7 -0.94 -1.15 -1.36 -1.57 -1.77























-1 -1.40 -1.62 -1.84 -2.06 -2.28
-2 -1.38 -1.60 -1.82 -2.03 -2.25
-3 -1.37 -1.58 -1.80 -2.01 -2.23
-4 -1.35 -1.57 -1.78 -1.99 -2.21
-5 -1.34 -1.55 -1.76 -1.97 -2.18
-6 -1.33 -1.53 -1.74 -1.95 -2.16
-7 -1.31 -1.52 -1.72 -1.93 -2.14























-1 -1.79 -2.01 -2.22 -2.44 -2.66
-2 -1.77 -1.99 -2.20 -2.42 -2.64
-3 -1.75 -1.97 -2.18 -2.39 -2.61
-4 -1.73 -1.94 -2.16 -2.37 -2.58
-5 -1.71 -1.92 -2.13 -2.34 -2.55
-6 -1.70 -1.90 -2.11 -2.32 -2.53





















Change in household default rate (in percentage points)
 
These sensitivity analyses suggest that the impact of the macroeconomic shock on GDP was 
stronger than the impact of the original shock. However, within our simple theoretical 
framework, we assume that households do not expect the macroeconomic shock. Hence, they   13
have not adjusted their consumption prior to the shock. Table 4 shows how important the 
additional consumption effects can be in the case of a significant increase in the household 




The economic downturn arguably makes it less likely that households will be able to repay 
their loans. Household budgets can be negatively affected by declines in nominal wages and 
increases in unemployment. This effect was empirically tested for the Czech economy. Our 
analysis describes two basic mechanisms causing the increase in household insolvency: a 
decline in nominal wages and an increase in unemployment. As a result of a lack of micro 
data on Czech household finances, the extent of their financial distress due to adverse 
macroeconomic shocks cannot be directly evaluated. However, with some simplifying 
assumptions, micro data were simulated and the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the 
household sector assessed. Alternatively, the macroeconomic approach utilizes a simple 
Merton-type one-factor model. Our analysis of a potential slump in nominal wages during 
2010 suggested that under the extreme scenario the budgets of about 30% – 50% of 
households with debt burdens would be in deficit if their nominal incomes were to decrease 
by more than 10%. This corresponds to roughly 7% - 12% of the total Czech population.  
The crucial second part of the empirical analysis deals with the estimation of aggregate 
consumption. Our relatively simple theoretical model showed the extent to which an 
unexpected increase in the household default and unemployment rates cause an additional 
decline in consumption, which is reflected in an economic slump. We illustrate that the 
impact of the change in unemployment on the size of that effect positively depends on the 
difference between the marginal propensities to consume for employed and unemployed 
consumers. Our analysis, based on the derived relationship for aggregate consumption, 
showed that for the Czech economy e.g. a 4 percentage point increase in the default rate and a 
3 percentage point increase in unemployment rate cause an additional decline in GDP of 
roughly 2 percentage points. If we do not take this effect into account, the expected decline in 
economic growth can be significantly underestimated. The study clearly shows the 
importance of the transmission channel via household balance sheets for the economy, which 
is usually not taken into account in macroeconomic and monetary policy models. Such 
omission of feedback effects on household consumption may produce a bias in economic 
policy making. 
   14
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Appendix 
 
One-factor Model with Default Barrier Depending on Macroeconomic Environment 
 
The one-factor model is one of the variants of the latent factor model which belongs to the 
class of Merton structural models (see e.g. Jakubík (2007) or Jakubík, Schmieder (2008) for 
the version of the one-factor model with default barrier depending on macroeconomic 
environment). A random variable with a standard normal distribution is assumed for the 
standardized logarithmic asset returns of economic agent i at time t: 
it t it U F R      1  (4) 
where Rit denotes the logarithmic asset return for economic agent i in an economy at time t, 
and Ft corresponds to the logarithmic asset return of the economy at time t, which is assumed 
to be a random variable with a standard normal distribution. This variable represents the part 
of the asset return which is not specific to the economic agent and can thus denote general 
economic conditions. Uit denotes the economic agent-specific asset return, which is again 
assumed to be random with a standard normal distribution. The two random variables are 
assumed to be serially independent. The portion of risk that is systematic is defined by i  , the 
correlation of the economic agent’s asset return with the systematic factor Ft. 
Given these assumptions, the logarithmic asset return of economic agent i at time t is also 
standard normally distributed. The model is based on the Merton model, according to which a 
default occurs if the return on an economic agent’s assets falls below a certain barrier T, the 
default threshold. Formally, 
) ( ) 1 ( T R P Y P it it    , (5) 
where Y denotes a binary random variable with two potential states, borrower i defaults (1), or 
does not default (0), at time t and T is the default threshold.  
In order to model aggregate credit risk by means of different macroeconomic indicators, it is 
further assumed – unlike in the case of Gordy’s Basel II one-factor-model (Gordy, 2003) – 
that the value of the default threshold T depends on the economic cycle. This is modeled by 
taking a linear combination of macroeconomic variables (xjt) to represent the value of the 
default threshold T. 
The final form of the macroeconomic one-factor credit risk model used in this study is shown 
in equation (6), where  denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
that represents the impact of a change in the macroeconomic indicators, 0 is a constant and j 
are the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables, xjt:  
 
 
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The default probability conditional on the realization Ft of a random unobservable factor 
representing the state of the economy at time t corresponding to the default probability (6) is 








































f x f x
U P f p   (7) 
 
If we furthermore assume a homogeneous portfolio of economic agents in the economy whose 
asset returns follow process (4), the default rate in the economy is – based on the law of large 
numbers – equivalent to the economic agent’s default probabilities. Accordingly, the model 
may then be applied to homogeneous sub-sectors of the economy such as the corporate sector 
and the household sector.  









i i t x df     (8) 
 
where dft denotes the dependent variable of the model (i.e. the default rate of the corporate or 
household sector),   is the coefficient vector, x is the vector of the macroeconomic variables 
and 0 is a constant.  
In order to estimate model (8), a relationship with a conditional number of defaults of 
economic agents depending on the realization of random variable F, the latent factor ft is used. 
This number is, under the given assumptions, again random and has a binomial distribution 
with conditional probability pi(ft) given by equation (7) and the number of economic agents 
Nt. 
)) ( , ( ) ( t t t f p N Bi f D   (9) 
The model is then calibrated by maximising a likelihood function (10).  
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Performance of credit risk models for Czech household sector 
Chart 1: Credit Risk Model for Czech Household Sector 
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